ENACTED LEGISLATION
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI: St. Louis city officials suspend marijuana testing for most public employees
Summary: New rules were approved by the St. Louis City Council regarding the suspension of marijuana-specific pre-employment and random drug screenings for public employees in non-safety sensitive positions.

The new rules states that "No person currently employed by St. Louis County or applying for employment by St. Louis County shall be required to undergo pre-employment or random drug testing for the presence of marijuana metabolites (THC) as a condition or part of employment."

Exceptions that permit cannabis screening include those who are required to undergo drug testing under specific state or federal laws, those who work in safety sensitive positions and those who are suspected of having been intoxicated on the job.

Impact(s): St. Louis County public employers
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COURT OPINIONS
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Article III standing found to be lacking for an alleged violation of the FCRA's "Pre-Adverse Action" notice provision
Summary: On April 4, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in holding that a plaintiff lacked Article III standing to prosecute her statutory claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in federal court.

The Eighth Circuit applied the Supreme Court precedent to FCRA claims against an employer in Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc. On behalf of a putative class, the plaintiff alleged that (1) the defendant allegedly provided a background check disclosure form that was not "clear and conspicuous" and contained "extraneous" information, and (2) the defendant allegedly failed to provide a proper "pre-adverse action notice" before rescinding her job offer that was conditioned on a successful background check. The plaintiff also added a third, less-common, theory alleging that the employer unlawfully procured her background check because the authorization she signed referred only to "an independent investigation of [her] criminal records maintained by public and private organizations," without using the phrase "consumer report." The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing as to each of her theories and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

As to the disclosure claim, the Eighth Circuit held that the mere fact the disclosure was in a small font and allegedly contained statements unrelated to the fact a consumer report would be obtained was not itself a concrete "injury-in-fact." The plaintiff failed to plead any specific facts of any "real-world harm" flowing from the alleged statutory violation of the FCRA's disclosure provision. Thus, even though the plaintiff alleged the form contained an unlawful release of liability, a statement that the company could terminate employment if she provided false information, and additional statements about potential rights that could apply if there was an adverse action, the plaintiff lacked standing.

As to the pre-adverse action claim, the Eighth Circuit stated that, even though the plaintiff did not receive a copy of the report, the plaintiff failed to allege that she suffered any material harm under the FCRA's pre-adverse action provision. The court further stated that the plaintiff's claim that she could not explain the report with her employer is immaterial, as this right does not exist under the FCRA. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff also lacked standing on her pre-adverse action claim.

As to the authorization claim, the Eighth Circuit held that the authorization did not have to specifically use the term "consumer report" to be valid. The authorization was broad enough to encompass all types of record searches that the employer had ordered in the background report on the plaintiff, as the authorization permitted the search of "criminal records maintained by public and private organizations." The court noted that the report consisted of criminal record searches and a sex offender registry search, which consists of public record information ultimately derived from criminal records. The court stated that even if we assumed the authorization was insufficient, the plaintiff's Article III standing would fail. The plaintiff had not pled any specific facts to show an actual invasion of privacy from the search; just referring to an "invasion of privacy" in a conclusory manner was insufficient to save the claim from dismissal.

Impact(s): All Missouri Employers
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SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN: Court eases the burden for employers defending arrest and conviction record discrimination claims under state law
Summary: In the recent case Cree, Inc. v. Palmer, the court rejected Labor and Industry Review Commission ("LIRC")'s view that domestic violence crimes cannot be substantially related to employment.

In 2013, a job applicant was convicted of committing eight crimes of domestic violence against his girlfriend. He pled no contest to two counts of felony strangulation and suffocation, four counts of misdemeanor battery, one count of fourth degree sexual assault, and one count of criminal damage to property. Two years later, after serving out his prison sentence, the applicant applied to Cree for a lighting applications specialist position. In that role, the applicant would have worked with Cree's customers, sometimes on location at customers' facilities, and with Cree's other employees. He also would have occasionally traveled for tradeshows, potentially overnight. During these customer visits and tradeshows, the applicant would have worked independently without much supervision. Cree made the applicant a conditional offer of employment, but after obtaining a background check and learning of his extensive criminal record, Cree withdrew the offer. The applicant then filed a complaint with the DWD alleging conviction record discrimination.

LIRC, following its pattern in prior domestic violence cases, classified the applicant's crimes as having occurred in a "domestic setting" and determined they were not substantially related to the position at Cree. Cree petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed LIRC and held that Cree sufficiently established that the circumstances of the applicant's convictions were substantially related to the circumstances of the job at Cree. The court offered a substantial relationship test that requires an employer show that the facts, events, and conditions surrounding the crime materially relate to the facts, events, and conditions surrounding the job. The court reinforced that details of the crime - such as the domestic context of the offense or an intimate relationship with the victim - are immaterial to the test. Instead, the relevant inquiry is into the circumstances material to fostering criminal activity. Under the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretation, the material circumstances are those that exist in the workplace that present opportunities for recidivism given the character traits revealed by the circumstances of a domestic violence conviction case.

In the job at Cree, the applicant would have been challenged by supervisors, coworkers, and customers, and these interactions could lead the applicant to react, consistent with his past behavior, in a violent manner in order to exert his own power or control. The absence of regular supervision would have created further opportunities for the applicant to engage in violence. With these considerations in mind, the court held that the applicant's conviction record was substantially related to the job at Cree.

Impact(s): Wisconsin employers
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